Cui Hongjian: Shouting about a 'trade war with China', some people in Europe are miscalculating

If there is a trade war with China, the largest import supplier of the European Union, European countries must make sufficient predictions about the consequences. Once China adopts a reciprocal countermeasure, it will shake the huge market that accounts for 23.1% of the EU's total imports and is difficult to fill, not to mention the supply chain issues that some EU members consider to be "choked". China has more superior space to deal with them

The French weekly "Express" recently published an editorial, calling out that "the EU must dare to launch a trade war against China", which has sparked controversy in the European public opinion. After member states failed to reach an agreement on "stricter trade measures" against China at the EU summit in June this year, China and Europe have agreed to seek further resolution of their differences under the bilateral trade and investment consultation mechanism. But some European media and politicians are still holding their breath, watching closely as "China's trade surplus with Europe continues to rise" and constantly making statements to "show determination to launch a trade war against China".

The current anxiety in Europe about "trade imbalance", declining international competitiveness, and even "forced deindustrialization" is very real, but if the main problems are attributed to external factors, directed towards Chinese partners, or even threatened with "starting a trade war", it is undoubtedly a wrong direction, finding the wrong target, and miscalculating.

Attributing anxiety to 'external trade shocks' is far fetched

The intuitive basis for European anxiety is that its statistical data shows that EU countries are buying more and selling less in foreign trade, accelerating their shift from surplus to deficit in global trade. Especially from May 2025 to May 2026, there was a sudden change in the situation. In May 2026, the eurozone's foreign trade surplus in goods reached 7.8 billion euros, while in May 2025, the EU's monthly trade surplus in goods was 12.7 billion euros; From January to May 2026, the EU's trade balance deficit was 15.9 billion euros, compared to a surplus of 70.1 billion euros in the same period of 2025. Although this is only monthly or quarterly data, and the EU still has a surplus of 128 billion euros in 2025, the trend it reflects has already greatly stimulated the EU.

In the past decade, except for the trade deficit caused by the energy supply problem caused by the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the EU has maintained a surplus in international trade. Therefore, in the face of rising export costs and an increasing energy trade deficit due to the high tariffs imposed by the United States, the European Union is concerned that 2026 may become a turning point for its transition from a trade surplus to a deficit.

But it is far fetched to interpret this concern and anxiety mainly as an external 'trade shock'. One reason is that the EU itself is well aware that the fundamental reason for its high imports and low exports in foreign trade is the weakening of its competitiveness due to changes in the cost structure of its products. Energy prices remain high, labor market reforms cannot be promoted, and national fiscal expenditures need to shift towards preparedness. In contrast, goods from China and other trading entities have a more reasonable cost structure, higher cost-effectiveness, and are more attractive to consumers. Secondly, for EU politicians, especially in a political environment where conservative politics and populist sentiment prevail, they cannot turn their backs and turn their swords inward, otherwise it will be difficult to explain their domestic emotions and their votes will be even more difficult to secure. Transferring contradictions outward is in line with the political logic of European democratic systems. Therefore, whether in the speeches of European politicians, repeated arguments from think tanks, or media opinion articles, the internal structural factors that cause trade deficits are all briefly mentioned, and the main focus is on external factors.

Using China as a scapegoat is absurd

Even if one tries to shift the blame outward, it would be even more absurd to directly point the finger at China and even demand a "tough response".

Looking back at the data that the EU has been talking about, the Eurozone's trade deficit in goods with foreign countries further widened in May 2026 compared to April, reaching 7.8 billion euros. Among them, the countries with the largest decline in EU exports and increase in imports are the United States, at 12.3% and 17.1% respectively, far higher than the 4.5% decline in exports to China and the 4.9% increase in imports during the same period. Even South Korea's trade indicators with the EU are much higher than China's. From the perspective of goods import and export categories, the largest difference in import and export fluctuations in the EU is in energy trade (a difference of 34.5%), while the largest decrease in exports is in chemical products (reaching 12.6%). The former has little direct relationship with China, and even if there is competition from China in the latter, the main reason is that the rise in energy prices has led to problems with the cost and price competitiveness of EU products.

However, due to very practical considerations, China is the most suitable target for being a "scapegoat": firstly, China has big goals and strong trade vitality, making it easy to become a "rising bird"; Secondly, China has always followed the rules and not acted arrogantly, nor will it easily engage in "big fights" around Europe and use "security issues" to force Europe to comply; Thirdly, there are institutional differences between Europe and China. Using the phrase "fighting a trade war with China" as an example is more likely to create gimmicks targeting institutional opponents among some people. At the same time, it can also help them quickly forget about the high tariffs and exploitation by the United States and the turmoil in the Middle East, which have added insult to injury to Europe's energy security; Fourthly, the EU's "narrative on China" is complete and can be easily grasped, ranging from so-called "overcapacity", "trade subsidies", "unfair competition" to "dividing Europe", which can be repeatedly and repeatedly discussed.

Some people in Europe should not overestimate their own abilities

The EU should also consider that even if it wants to engage in a trade war with China, it must first weigh whether its internal collective will and ability to take action are sufficient. Before the EU summit, some European countries came aggressively, intending to come up with a "war plan" against China at the meeting, but the final result was obvious to all. The lesson that the EU can learn from the fruitless summit is that some European countries have already integrated and deeply bound their economic interests with China, from trade to technology, industry, and key raw material supply, and it is difficult to find alternative markets outside of China from both the supply and demand sides. The EU has been promoting "de risk" measures towards China since a few years ago, encouraging its companies and investments to shift to other markets. However, it has been proven that most companies are not convinced and this path is not feasible.

Therefore, if a trade war is to be waged with China, the largest import supplier of the European Union, European countries must make sufficient predictions about the consequences. Once China adopts a reciprocal countermeasure, it will shake the huge market that accounts for 23.1% of the EU's total imports and is difficult to fill, not to mention the supply chain issues that some EU members consider to be "choked". China has more superior space to deal with them.

For the sake of the face of the European Union and the political interests of some politicians, are those European public opinions who shout 'dare to wage a trade war with China' mentally, market, financially, socially, and politically prepared to pay such a huge price? After unsuccessful attempts to exert collective pressure on China at the EU summit, the EU has not completely abandoned its tough stance on China and is preparing to come up with a comprehensive plan to deal with the "China Shock 2.0" before October, with France and Germany taking the lead. This is the main political background for European public opinion to continue stirring up the "trade war with China" and creating momentum for the EU's plan in the near future.

The idea, statement, and approach of some Europeans attempting to "force China to the negotiating table with a trade war" while succumbing to the high tariffs imposed by the United States and knowing that the main crux of the current trade deficit lies in the rampant protectionism and unilateralism is nothing but a poor imitation of the tariff war strategy across the Atlantic. This not only deviates from the principles of free and fair trade, overestimates its own capabilities, attempts to use political intentions and public opinion to interfere with economic laws and market logic, and thereby achieve the transfer of contradictions and external treatment of internal diseases, but also seriously underestimates China's intention and ability to "come and not harm".

If it is truly for the economic interests and people's well-being of Europe, in addition to demonstrating courage and responsibility to promote long-term changes in its internal political and economic structure, what the EU should do now is not to engage in a trade war with China with unclear goals and worrying consequences in a hot headed situation, nor to imitate others' deterrence strategies to pressure China. Instead, it should first restore rationality, maintain communication in the bilateral consultation mechanism based on the dialogue consensus reached by both sides, and express anxiety and concerns with appropriate honesty. At the same time, abandon unnecessary means of political and public opinion manipulation. China has always treated the EU with a partnership and has been patient on the other side of the negotiating table. The EU should not lose its direction at critical moments and miss the opportunity to move forward with China. Instead, it needs to accelerate its pace. (The author is Cui Hongjian, Director of the European Union and Regional Development Research Center at Beijing Foreign Studies University)