Editorial: 'Chinese brands' should not be used as an excuse for German protectionism
The industrial civilization nurtured by the Rhine River was once known for its precision, rationality, and openness. However, the recent two controversies surrounding Chinese electric vehicles in German politics have revealed a sense of anxiety that does not align with this tradition.
One is that German Finance Minister Klimbauer publicly expressed dissatisfaction with Deutsche Bahn's purchase of buses from BYD, proposing the so-called "healthy local industry patriotism" and believing that Deutsche Bahn should place orders with German or European manufacturers more; The second is that the German government announced that it will resume subsidies for electric vehicle purchases, which has raised concerns among Deloitte's automotive experts about the "flow of subsidy funds to China" and attempted to set an invisible threshold for Chinese brands through institutional design. These discussions essentially reflect a tendency to politicize normal market choices.
Truly responsible 'patriotism of local industries' should focus on the long-term competitiveness of national industries, rather than being confined to short-term market share, and should not be alienated into exclusion of foreign products and investments. Taking the procurement of Deutsche Bahn buses as an example, among orders with a total scale of over 3000 vehicles, BYD only won about 200 bids, and the vehicles are produced in a Hungarian factory, strictly speaking, they belong to "Made in Europe". This is not only a normal business choice under global division of labor, but also a rational judgment of enterprises based on cost, efficiency, and reliability.
If even such limited, transparent, and compliant procurement needs to be repeatedly examined under a political microscope, then the problem may not lie in "Made in China" or "Chinese brands". A confident industrial powerhouse should dare to absorb high-quality global supply on the application side and improve its own system efficiency through competition, rather than tying taxpayer interests and business operations to emotional political expressions.
Similar anxiety is also reflected in the discussion of new energy subsidy policies. Worries about subsidies flowing into the pockets of Chinese people are essentially an extension of zero sum thinking, but ignore the highly nested reality of modern industrial chains. The sale of an electric vehicle does not mean a one-way capital outflow, but rather drives the development of a whole set of local economic activities such as logistics, sales, after-sales, charging facility construction, and energy services. The advantages of Chinese companies in battery technology and cost control are objectively providing tools for Europe's green transformation to reduce costs and increase efficiency.
If this chain is artificially cut off, the result will only be that European consumers bear higher transformation costs, local enterprises lose the "catfish effect" brought by competitive vitality, and industrial upgrading will be slowed down instead. In the global economic system of 'you in me, I in you', capital flow is not plunder, but a cycle in the process of value creation. China has neither the intention nor the ability to 'make all the money', because truly sustainable profits always flow towards higher efficiency and faster innovation.
Viewing external competition as a 'survival threat' often masks the urgency of structural issues during the transition period. The challenges facing the German automotive industry today are essentially the pains that must be experienced to move from the era of internal combustion engines to the era of electrification and digitization. This is the result of a technological paradigm shift, not a product of any country's "squeezing". Persistently guarding against "Chinese cars" and excluding Chinese investment is actually replacing industrial policy discussions with geopolitical narratives, which not only fails to address practical shortcomings such as software capabilities, battery raw material supply, and energy costs, but may also miss the time window for self reform.
History has repeatedly proven that building a wall for backward production capacity through political means can only bring temporary psychological comfort, but it will cause the protected to lose vitality in the greenhouse. The future of the German automotive industry does not depend on whether it can keep its competitors out, but on whether it can regain the spirit of engineers who dare to self doubt on a new track and rebuild a truly globally competitive industrial advantage.
The growth of China's electric vehicle industry has never been aimed at weakening European industry, but rather a public supply formed in the global response to climate change. From the continuous flow of components on the China Europe freight train, to the establishment of research and development centers by German car companies in China, and to Chinese battery companies investing in factories in Germany, Hungary, and Spain, the China Europe automotive industry has formed a deeply intertwined community of interests. The Chinese market and supply chain are also important pillars supporting the global strategy of European car companies.
According to the International Energy Agency, the global shortage of new energy vehicles will reach 27 million by 2030. China and Germany have strong complementarity in the field of electric vehicles, and both sides can fully share the development dividends on this supply chain in a healthy atmosphere of open cooperation.