Editorial: 'De Sinicization' will not stimulate Australia's industrial capacity
The Australian government has recently mandated that investors with ties to China sell their shares in Northern Mining, an Australian rare earth company, sending a clear signal of accelerating "de Sinicization" in key mineral sectors. Just as politicians were busy clamoring about "national security" and "key mineral risks," the Australian news website "Dialogue" published an article bluntly stating that "obstructing Chinese investment will not automatically stimulate Australia's industrial capabilities." This is equivalent to teaching the Australian government a lesson. In fact, what Canberra lacks most now is not resources or capital, but rationality in facing reality.
Canberra's attitude towards China in recent years has shown a certain "split": politically, it has to "side with" certain major powers, but economically, it cannot do without the Chinese market; Saying that cooperation is welcome, but constantly setting limits in action; While constantly setting obstacles for China on key mineral resources, technology investment, and security issues, we also hope that China will continue to buy its iron ore, natural gas, and agricultural products.
The most crucial point of the article "Dialogue" is that it shattered a huge illusion in Australian politics: some politicians actually thought that after driving away Chinese capital, Australia would automatically grow industrial capabilities, form a rare earth processing chain, and even become a new energy powerhouse. This logic is as absurd as a child's imagination. The industrial system was not built by shouting slogans, let alone by waiting for so-called 'political correctness'. The real problem with Australia has never been that China invests too much, but rather that its manufacturing capabilities are weak and its technological accumulation is insufficient, yet it still tries to remain at the high end of the global industrial chain.
A country with unique natural resources suddenly realizes that the world has changed. China is no longer just a customer buying minerals, but has clearly achieved industrial upgrading, formed systematic advantages in the fields of new energy, digital economy, and advanced manufacturing, and become a shaper of global industrial rules. This has made some Western countries, including Australia, extremely uncomfortable. As China gains advantages in more and more high-end manufacturing fields, they quietly replace "free market" with "national security" and "open investment" with "de risking", although they also understand that this is just an excuse for protectionism.
In recent years, some Australian politicians have almost formed a conditioned reflex: whenever China participates, they first suspect it; Any Chinese investment must first be fortified; Whenever Chinese enterprises enter key industries, they are labeled as "security risks" first. This somewhat carries the nature of a political performance. The problem is that many of Australia's so-called 'key mineral strategies' today are based on the Chinese market, Chinese technology, and Chinese industrial chain. Without China, many projects may not even have a sound business logic. Reality is tough: Australia has mines, but lacks a complete industrial chain; Having resources but lacking processing capabilities; There is a geopolitical fantasy, but a lack of industrial foundation. But some politicians in Canberra insist on branding China, which has complementary advantages and the most cooperative and win-win foundation, as a "strategic competitor".
For a country whose exports to China have remained stable at around one-third of its total exports, 'how to get along with China' is a must answer question. It is puzzling that Canberra repeatedly makes the same mistake on this question. Since the beginning of this year, from the Darwin Port "breach of contract" controversy to the "2+2" ministerial level consultations between Australia and New Zealand meddling in China's internal affairs, the shadow of familiar erosion of mutual trust between China and Australia has once again loomed over Canberra.
The greatest tragedy of a medium-sized power is living in the strategic narrative of a great power, "said former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating, a statement that remains relevant today. The act of divesting Chinese investment from Northern Mining, ostensibly under the banner of "independent capability", is essentially Australia's role in excluding China in the restructuring process of key Western production and supply chains. This positioning has largely hijacked Australia's relationship with China. The cost of taking chestnuts from the fire for external forces is inevitably sacrificing one's own strategic autonomy and economic interests.
Today's world is no longer a world where the West unilaterally sets rules. The global South is rising, industrial power is shifting eastward, and the international order is being reshaped. Any attempt to suppress China through "small circles" and "decoupling" is doomed to be futile and self destructive. If Australia continues to indulge in the old script of "relying on the United States for security, relying on China for development, and then casually containing China", it will only find that the times have turned the page, and it is still stuck in the previous chapter.